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 Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) methodology’s limitations.  
 Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes – Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STAMP-STPA).  
 Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA).  
 Combination of different prospective safety management techniques.  
 Analysis of medication administration process in home setting.  
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ABSTRACT 
Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) is a systematic risk assessment method 
derived from high risk industries to prospectively examine complex healthcare processes. Like most 
methods, HFMEA has strengths and weaknesses. In this paper we provide a review of HFMEA’s 
limitations and we introduce an expanded version of traditional HFMEA, with the addition of two 
safety management techniques: Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Analysis 
(SHERPA) and Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes – Systems-Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STAMP-STPA). The combination of the three methodologies addresses significant 
HFMEA limitations. To test the viability of the proposed hybrid technique, we applied it to assess 
the potential failures in the process of administration of medication in the home setting. Our 
findings suggest that it is both a viable and effective tool to supplement the analysis of failures and 
their causes. We also found that the hybrid technique was effective in identifying corrective actions 
to address human errors and detecting failures of the constraints necessary to maintain safety.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the field of safety-critical engineering, a number of risk analysis techniques have been developed 
and applied. A standard practice in high-risk industries are prospective hazard analysis techniques, 
like Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability (HAZOP), Systematic 
Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA), Human Error Analysis and Barrier 
Analysis, just to name a few (Potts et al., 2014). These techniques have been designed with the aim 
to anticipate and prevent harm in error-prone processes, rather than relying on corrective actions 
after the incidents have occurred (Potts et al., 2014). 
Over the past two decades, similar safety approaches have been adopted in healthcare, in order to 
analyse high risk processes (Habraken, 2009). One of the most popular methods is Healthcare 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA). HFMEA is a five-step multidisciplinary procedure 
developed by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs’ National Center for Patient Safety 
in 2002. Recent studies have recognised the importance of applying HFMEA to identify potential 
failures, causes and consequences. It has been largely applied to the processes of administration and 
ordering of drugs (Wetterneck, 2004; Esmail et al., 2004; Vélez-Díaz-Pallarés et al., 2013), 
sterilization and use of surgical instruments (Linkin et al., 2005), as well as prevention of errors in 
radiotherapy (Van Tilburg et al., 2006) and chemotherapy (Cheng et al., 2012).  
Despite these numerous applications, experts have debated possible amendments to the HFMEA 
approach in order to address its limitations (Habraken et al., 2009; Franklin, Shebl, & Barber, 
2012). Specifically, it has been suggested that HFMEA could be improved by combining the 
traditional approach with different risk analysis techniques (Stanton et al., 2004, 2009, 2005, 2013, 
2014;  Ambrahamsen et al., 2016). 
The aim of this paper is to present an overview of HFMEA’s criticisms and introduce an extended, 
hybrid version of HFMEA obtained with the addition of two supplementary risk assessment tools 
that can address specific HFMEA limitations – namely Systematic Human Error Reduction and 
Prediction Approach (SHERPA) and Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes – Systems-
Theoretic Process Analysis (STAMP-STPA). We further present prospective data to test the 
viability of the new technique in the context of medication administration in homecare settings. The 
detailed results of the application of the composite approach with the subsequent clinical 
implications are reported in (Parand et al, just-accepted).  
Our work rests on the following rationale: the hybrid approach completes the healthcare focused 
approach (HFMEA) with human factor-focused (HTA and SHERPA) and system-focused 
(STAMP) approaches. SHERPA steps have analogies with HFMEA steps. For example, both 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
4 
 
methodologies require depiction of the process with diagrams, with the aim to identify failures. 
SHERPA focuses on human error and in this sense the combination of HFMEA failure 
identification with SHERPA human error identification leads to the advantages of a socio-technical 
risk assessment approach. Further, SHERPA consequence analysis is useful to review the severity 
ratings because it encourages the team members to examine in details the rates in correspondence to 
the consequences of each failure. STAMP-STPA formalises the HFMEA cause analysis with a 
system approach that helps identify the controls and constraints necessary to prevent undesirable 
interactions between system components.   
The following section provides an overview of the HFMEA method and its critique. 
Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and its limitations 
HFMEA is a multidisciplinary method that combines the concepts, the components and the 
definitions of industrial FMEA, Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point and Root Cause Analysis  
HFMEA is a proactive risk analysis method that involves a multidisciplinary team to map out a 
high-risk healthcare process and identify the potential failures that can occur within the process 
activities (DeRosier et al. 2002). It comprises five main steps (DeRoiser et al., 2002). The first step 
consists in the choice of the topic, which usually is a highly vulnerable or/and high risk process of 
care. The second step is establishing a multidisciplinary team. The third step is creation of a 
graphical representation of the process and identification of potential failure modes. This is 
generally done by means of a box and arrow diagram. For major and complex processes, it is 
suggested to focus on a single highly vulnerable activity (known as the ‘scope’ of the analysis). The 
process diagram aims to guide the team in identification of potential failures for each activity. The 
fourth step is the hazard analysis. During this step, the failures identified in the third step are scored 
with severity and probability ratings (each using four point scales accompanied by written 
descriptions) that are multiplied to calculate a hazard score. Severity is related to the seriousness of 
the effects of failures; probability of occurrence is the likelihood that failures will occur. The hazard 
score is intended to guide the team’s efforts by highlighting the failures with the highest score 
(called critical failures) that need attention. The critical failures that warrant further action are then 
selected using a decision tree, answering questions about the criticality, detectability and presence 
of control measures. For the critical failures, the potential causes and the potential effects are listed 
and further examined. Finally, in the fifth step, the team formulates recommendations to prevent or 
mitigate the critical failures with suggested outcome measures to evaluate the effect of the 
implemented solutions. A worksheet is used to record the failures, their causes, the team’s 
assessment, the proposed actions, and the outcome measures. 
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HFMEA has been evaluated and critiqued by several authors. Table 1 summarises some of the most 
common HFMEA limitations and proposed solutions at each step of the process. 
 
 
Criticisms of HFMEA   Proposed solutions 
Graphical description of the process 
 The graphical representation of the process is 
subjective (Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2009). 
 
 The box-and-arrow diagram provides only minimal 
information (Chadwick & Fallon, 2013). 
 
 The box-and-arrow diagram does not include a 
description of the control measures (Chadwick & 
Fallon, 2013). 
Improve the process representation using other diagram 
types, e.g. task analysis and IDEF - Integrated 
Definition for Function Modelling (Chadwick & Fallon, 
2013; Franklin, Shebl, & Barber, 2012). 
Hazard Analysis   
Identification of failures 
 
 The definition of the potential failures is too 
subjective (Vélez-Díaz-Pallarés et al., 2013). 
 
 Before identification of potential failures, there is a 
poor consultation of existing evidence (Habraken et 
al., 2009; Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2009;  Ashley et 
al., 2010a-b ; Nagpal et al., 2010) 
 
 During the identification of potential failures, human 
errors are overlooked (Habraken et al., 2009;  Franklin 
et al., 2012;  Chadwick & Fallon, 2013). 
 Prepare an initial list of failures according to existing 
evidence to use before the identification of potential 
failures (Habraken et al., 2009). 
 
 Define scenarios and formulate basic assumptions to 
map the main activities of the process and identify 
failures (Habraken et al., 2009 ; Chadwick & Fallon, 
2013). 
 
 Include human error taxonomy to identify human 
errors (Chadwick & Fallon, 2013) 
Scoring of failures 
 
 The rating procedure could be affected by personal 
interpretations of probability and severity scales 
(Wetterneck et al., 2004)(Habraken et al., 2009; 
Chadwick & Fallon, 2013; Vlayen, 2011). 
 
 An inappropriate rating procedure, such as 
brainstorming, can influence and bias the individual 
ratings (Ashley et al., 2010a-b). 
 
 The HFMEA procedure does not require the 
identification of the activities at which the error could 
be recovered(recovery points) (Chadwick & Fallon, 
2013). 
 
 The decision tree results can be difficult to understand 
and use (Habraken et al., 2009; Chadwick & Fallon, 
2013). 
 Adapt the rating scales to the process analysed 
(Wetterneck et al., 2004; Habraken et al., 
2009;Chadwick & Fallon, 2013; Vlayen, 2011). 
 
 Rate the failures with a scoring procedure able to 
determine the individual point of view, i.e. substitute 
the focus group with an individual confirmatory 
formal analysis step of prioritizing the failures 
(Nagpal et al., 2010).  
 
 Extend the hazard analysis with the identification of 
recovery activities (Chadwick & Fallon, 2013). 
 
 Change the decision tree to make it more 
understandable (Chadwick & Fallon, 2013; Habraken 
et al., 2009). 
Cause analysis  
 
 The HFMEA procedure does not provide guidelines to 
identify and analyse causes. 
 
 The HFMEA procedure does not include guidelines to 
translate the causes into countermeasures. 
 
(Chadwick & Fallon, 2013; Habraken et al., 2009) 
Perform a cause analysis with a system approach that 
takes into account the complexity of processes. 
 
(Chadwick & Fallon, 2013;Habraken et al., 2009) 
Identification of prevention measures and controls 
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The HFMEA procedure does not support continuous 
improvement. 
(Chadwick & Fallon, 2013) 
Improve the prevention measures and controls already in 
use in the process. 
(Chadwick & Fallon, 2013) 
Table 1 – HFMEA steps with criticisms and proposed solutions 
   
METHODS 
HFMEA combined with SHERPA and STAMP-STPA 
We chose to combine HFMEA with two proactive risk analysis methodologies: SHERPA and 
STAMP-STPA. SHERPA supports the study of human-based processes (Lyons et al., 2004) and 
STAMP-STPA improves the causal analysis with a new classification of causes in terms of unsafe, 
inadequate or absent controls (hence it adds the perspective of cause as control problems) (Bjerga et 
al., 2016).  
Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Analysis (SHERPA) 
SHERPA is a human error identification and analysis technique developed by Embrey (1986) to 
predict human errors in a structured manner in the nuclear industry. It uses Hierarchical Task 
Analysis (HTA: Stanton, 2006) together with a taxonomy of human errors to identify errors 
associated with the sequence of activities that compose the process. SHERPA has undergone 
extensive validation trials (Stanton and Stevenage, 1998; Stanton and Young, 1999a-b; Stanton et 
al, 2009). It comprises several steps: (Stanton et al., 2005; 2013):  
 
1. The process is broken down into a hierarchy of tasks (i.e., activities executed to achieve the 
goals) and plans (i.e., the sequence in which the activities are executed). Each task is classified 
into actions (e.g., pressing a button, pulling a switch, opening a door), retrieval (e.g., getting 
information from a screen, manual, expert), checking (e.g., conducting a procedural check), 
selection (e.g., choosing one alternative over another) and information communication (e.g., 
talking to another party).  
 
2. The activities are evaluated for potential errors using the human error taxonomy. The types of 
error that may occur fall into one of the aforementioned five categories: action, checking, 
retrieval, communication and selection. Each error is judged according to its consequences and 
probability of occurrence. Consequences deemed to be critical (i.e., it causes unacceptable 
losses, it results in system/process failure or in an adverse event) are noted and assessed for 
whether the error could be corrected at some point during the process. This is useful to 
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determine the points of weakness (i.e., if the activity fails, the entire process would fail) and 
identify whether or not there are effective control measures.  
 
3. The final stage is a proposal of error mitigation and reduction strategies. Typically, these 
strategies can be categorized as equipment, training, procedures or organizational, which can be 
evaluated by their feasibility and effectiveness. 
 
Research comparing SHERPA with other human error identification methodologies suggests that it 
performs better than other similar methods in a wide range of scenarios (Kirwan,1992; Stanton et 
al., 2009).  SHERPA has been applied in a wide range of domains, from purchases at vending 
machines (Baber and Stanton, 1996; Stanton and Stevenage, 1998), through the prediction of pilots’ 
errors (Harris et al., 2005; Stanton et al, 2009) to the assessment of military command and control 
systems (Salmon et al, 2012). In healthcare, SHERPA has been applied to analyse the nature and 
the incidence of errors during laparoscopic surgery (Joice et al.,1998) and to detect errors in the 
process of drug administration in hospital (Lane, Stanton, & Harrison, 2006). 
Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes & System Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STAMP-STPA) 
STAMP is a modelling approach proposed by Leveson to capture the dynamics of a complex socio-
technical system (Leveson, 2004; Leveson, 2015; Bjerga et al., 2016). It is based on the theory that 
systems are interrelated components linked by feedback loops and the accidents result from 
inadequate control or inadequate enforcement of safety-related constraints of the system (Leveson, 
2004). STPA is the associated hazard identification technique, that is used to predict the causes of 
an accident in terms of the lack or controls and constraints (Stanton et al., 2013; Qureshi, 2008). 
The analysis can be conducted in several steps (Leveson, 2013): 
 
1. Create a complete list of control actions starting from a translation of high-level system hazards 
into safety constraints/requirements. 
 
2. Represent the safety requirements thorough an architectural description that is a hierarchical 
control structure of a general socio-technical system (also called functional control structure). 
This is composed by a basic structure that includes details about the control actions and the 
feedback relationships - contextualised in control loops, actuators, sensors, controllers, and 
controlled process (figure 1-A). The actuators are the variables managed by the controller that 
supposedly guarantees that the safety constraints are respected, the sensors are the elements of 
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the process that give information about its safety state and the controllers (human or automated) 
are the elements that have a deep knowledge of the process and can control it. The control loop 
has to be simplified and has to reflect the system of interest (Leveson, 2004; Antoine, 2013). 
For this reason, it is possible to focus on a single area, such as the operating process of a general 
socio-technical system (Leveson, 2004). 
 
3. Identification of unsafe control actions and their causes (i.e., events that would lead to the 
failure of the safety constraints). The identification is done by means of guidewords (e.g., 
‘inadequate control algorithm’, ‘control input’, ‘wrong or missing’) provided by Leveson (2004) 
into a general taxonomy of causal factors. The general taxonomy is articulated into three main 
categories of unsafe control measures (figure 1-B). It should be adapted to the analysed process 
(Kazaras et al., 2014). 
  
 
Figure 1 – (A): STAMP-STPA - A typical control loop of an operating process 
(B): STAMP-STPA – General taxonomy of causal factors (Leveson, 2004) 
 
STAMP-STPA has been applied in a number of domains, including the investigation of a complex 
aircraft collision avoidance system, the contamination of a Canadian water supply system and in the 
construction of road tunnels (Qureshi, 2008; Kazaras et al., 2014). It has been recently applied in 
the healthcare sector to identify and document the hazards in a radiation oncology process and in a 
proton therapy system (Samost, 2015; Antoine, 2013). The technique was also tailored to the 
domain of Medical Application Platforms (Procter et al., 2014). Figure 2 provides an example of 
control loops of two different healthcare processes. 
 
A B 
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Hybrid HFMEA: the combined approach 
Table 2 presents the order of the methods used within our proposed hybrid HFMEA – based on the 
standard steps of HFMEA, SHERPA and STAMP-STPA arranged in conceptual and chronological 
sequence. 
Hybrid HFMEA 
Steps 
# Sub-
Steps HFMEA 
 
SHERPA 
 
STAMP-STPA 
Graphical 
description of the 
process 
1 
 
Box-and-arrow 
diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
Hierarchical Task 
Analysis Diagram 
& 
Task Classification 
Representation of the 
Control Loop 
     
Hazard Analysis 
3 
Failures 
identification 
 
 
 
 
4  
Human error 
classification 
 
5 Failure scoring 
 
 
 
 
6  
 
Consequence Analysis 
 
 
7 
Check the 
coherence of 
severity scores 
  
Figure 2 – (C): Control functional loop of radiation oncology process (Samost, 2015). 
(D): Control functional loop of proton therapy system (Antoine, 2013) 
C D 
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8 
 
Hazard score 
calculation 
 
  
9  
Recovery Analysis and 
identification of the 
single point of 
weakness 
 
10 
 
Selection of the 
critical failures 
 
 
 
 
11   
 
List of the existing 
control measures 
 
     
Cause Analysis 
12 
Cause 
identification 
 
 
 
 
13   
 
Cause classification 
 
     
Identification of 
prevention 
measures and 
controls 
14 
 
Definition of 
solutions and 
outcome measures 
 
 
Remedy Analysis 
 
15   
Upgrade of the 
control loop with 
suggested solutions 
 
Table 2 – Conceptual and chronological sequence of the combined approach 
 
RESULTS 
A case-study application: analysis of medication administration in the home setting 
In order to verify its feasibility of the hybrid HFMEA, the approach was applied to a healthcare-
derived clinical application: medication administration (MA) by informal carers (friends, relatives - 
(Donelan et al., 2002)) at home (Parand et al., just-accepted). Recent studies have demonstrated that 
this process is high-risk prone and the home drug-related adverse events are very common (Masotti 
et al., 2010).  
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Analysis set up 
Before starting the analysis, two researchers (AP & GF) assembled a multidisciplinary team of 14 
members with different backgrounds and experiences: researchers with expertise in human factors 
and ergonomics, pharmacists, elderly care consultants, community nurses, psychologists, patient 
representatives, family member informal carers and an outsider; three members had prior expertise 
in HFMEA. 
Successively, as suggested by (Habraken et al., 2009), the team was split up into four small groups 
of ten people, with an appropriate mix of representatives (e.g., 3 pharmacists, 2 psychologists, 2 
patients, 1 elderly care consultant physician, 1 community nurse and 1 family member carer. In 
addition to a team leader, there were three facilitators with prior expertise in HFMEA. The team 
included lay members who were not familiar with the specific study topic). 
From a review of the literature on safety in MA at home, the researchers (AP & GF) prepared a 
graphical representation of the process (i.e., box-and-arrow diagram), validated by one informal 
carer, one nurse and two pharmacists. Since the carers can administer different medications, two 
scenarios were defined: one for low risk medications (i.e., tablets) and another for high risk (i.e., 
insulin injections). 
Next, the HFMEA severity rating scale was customised with the evidence-based severity scale 
proposed by Westbrook et al. (2010). Finally, the HFMEA and SHERPA ratings were combined 
(Table 3). In order to support the collection of the information, a new worksheet was designed (see 
Appendix A) with the aim to record, for each failure, the SHERPA classification of human error, 
the consequences, the process recovery points and the hazard scores. The analysis was articulated 
into four meetings of two hours each (8 hours in total), a duration that is the minimum comparable 
with other studies (Ashley et al., 2010 b). 
 
 
 
SHERPA ratings 
 
HFMEA ratings High (H) Medium (M) 
 
Low (L) 
 
Severity (S) 
 
Major 
Catastrophic 
Moderate Minor 
 
Probability (P) 
 
Frequent 
Occasional 
Uncommon 
Remote 
Table 3 – SHERPA ratings and HFMEA ratings 
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Graphical description of the process and SHERPA Task Classification 
The box-and-arrow diagram of MA process was broken down into SHERPA’s hierarchical task 
analysis (HTA) diagram. The HTA of medication administration process revealed seven main sub-
processes and 23 activities/tasks, diversified between tablets and injections (Figure 3). 
The graphical representation was then integrated with the STAMP-STPA’s control loop (Figure 4). 
In order to build the control loop, it was necessary to define and identify the controllers, sensors and 
actuators of the MA process in the domiciliary setting. The controllers were defined as the 
supervisors of the principle process’ steps, such as the informal carers, whose activities are 
consecutively controlled by the community physicians and/or pharmacists; the sensors were the 
means used by the controllers to monitor the process and receive information (e.g., regular checks) 
and the actuators were the means used by the controllers to impose the constraints and avoid 
dangerous situations (e.g., supporting documents, utensils used for the safe administration of 
medications and training). All these elements were identified according to official guidelines and 
policies on MA in domiciliary settings currently in place in Europe and UK. 
In accordance with SHERPA’s step of Task Classification, each task of the HTA diagram was 
classified into action, checking, retrieval, information communication or selection with very good 
agreement (kappa=0.875) by two team members (AP & GF) and the majority of activities were 
considered to be ‘action’, followed by ‘checks’ and ‘retrieval’ tasks (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 –HTA diagram of medication administration process and SHERPA task classification for high and low 
risk scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 4 – STAMP-STPA: Operating Control Loop of medication administration by informal carers.  
[GPs = General Practitioners; MA = Medication Administration] 
 
 
 
 
 
0.
Medication Administration 
1.
Understand the 
prescription
1.1 Understand 
information about 
therapeutic effects
1.2 Understand 
information about 
administration (e.g. 
doses, timing)
1.3 Understand 
information about side 
effects
1.4 Understand 
information about 
instructions
2.
Store the 
medication
2.2 Store in a 
correct place
2.1 Store in a 
safe place
3. 
Pre-monitor the 
patient's well being
4.
Prepare the 
medication
4.1 Read the current 
prescription
4.2 Check the time
4.3 Select the medication
4.4 Check the time, 
the expiry date and 
specific instructions
4.5 Prepare the space 
and utensils
4.6 Check the 
appearance of medication
4.7 Measure out the dose
4.8 (*) Prepare the patient
5. 
Give the 
medication
5.1 Give the medication
5.2 (Ɉ) Ensure that 
the medication has 
been taken/given
5.3 Record the 
given/non-given 
medication
6.
Post-monitor the 
patient's well-being
6.1 Recognize side 
effects
6.2 Notify side 
effects to HCPs
7. 
Store or discard 
the medication
7.1 (Ɉ) Put the 
medication back in its 
packaging
7.2 Check the 
remaining amount of 
medication
7.3 Discard
old/expired medications 
and used utensils.
7.4 Order new 
medication and utensils 
in short supply
Plan 0: do 1 then repeat 2, 3, 4, 5 in order  and 6, 7 in any order  
until the new prescription 
Plan 1: do 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 in any order 
Plan 2: do 2.1,2.2 at the same time 
Plan 4: do 4.1,4.2,4.3 in any order then do 4.4 and then do 4.5,4.6,4.7,4.8  in any order 
Plan 5: do 5.1,5.2,5.3 in order 
Plan 6: if 6.1 then 6.2 
Plan 7: do 7.1 then do 7.2,7.3 at the same time then do 7.4 
Legend of symbols:  
*: Not applicable to scenario 1: Administration of low risk tablets (T) medications by a carer. 
Ɉ: Not applicable to scenario 2: Administration of high risk insulin (I) by a carer. 
 
Task classification: 
A: Action (e.g., pressing a button) 
R: Retrieval (e.g., getting information from a manual) 
C: Checking (e.g., conducting a check) 
S: Selection (e.g., choosing one alternative over another) 
I: Information and communication (e.g., talking to another party) 
R 
R 
R 
R 
A 
A 
R 
C 
S 
C 
A 
C 
A 
A 
A 
A 
C 
C 
I 
A 
C 
A 
A 
1/3 (T) 
1/10 (I) 
1/8 (I) 
1/8 (I) 
1/7 (T) 
1/7 (T) 
A/B  A (numerator) is the number of high risk failure modes. 
B (denominator) is the total number of failure modes for each sub-task. 
Process Diagram & SHERPA Task classification 
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Hazard Analysis: identification, classification and filtering of failures  
During the failure identification, the team recognised 34 failures that were classified into human 
errors using SHERPA’s taxonomy with a good agreement (kappa=0.707) by two team members 
(AP & GF). This classification revealed that the most frequent human errors were: wrong action on 
the right object (7 of 34 failures), action omitted (7 of 34), check omitted (6 of 34), and incomplete 
information retrieval (4 of 34).  
The failures were then scored by the team members with an individual scoring procedure, followed 
by a global discussion to reach consensus.  
Once all the failures were scored, two researchers (AP & GF) applied SHERPA’s step of 
consequence analysis to solve the discrepancies in the severity ratings. Once the hazard scores were 
recalculated, the failures were further analysed with the SHERPA’s step of recovery analysis and 
the STAMP-STPA’s step of identification of existing control measures. This action simplified the 
use of the decision tree and consequently the identification of the critical failures.  
 
Cause Analysis 
Once the critical failures were identified, their causes were analysed and classified according to a 
customised version of the STAMP-STPA taxonomy of causal factors. The generic scheme of 
STAMP-STPA taxonomy was adapted to fulfil the process of MA in home care. Particularly, the 
scheme was divided into three main parts: inadequate control measures (i.e., alarms, double checks, 
supporting materials, utensils, training), inadequate use of control measures (i.e., lack of checks, 
misuse of supporting materials, misuse of utensils, absence of training, ineffective training) and 
inadequate exchange of information about the process (i.e., information provided by oversight, 
reports, measures of indicators - see Appendix B). The causal analysis showed that the failures were 
mainly caused by carers who do not adequately use possible control measures of the MA process, 
such as recording various types of information (e.g. the medications given, the date of order) or 
using organisational tools (e.g. spreadsheets, reminders). 
Identification of Prevention Measures and Controls 
At the end of the causal analysis, during a brainstorming session, the team members identified 
feasible recommendations and solutions to prevent the critical failures. The majority of solutions 
were an improvement of the control measures already in place and for each recommendation the 
team identified the supervisor(s) and the outcome measures.. Later, the solutions were classified 
according to the SHERPA’s step of Remedy Analysis in four classes: equipment (redesign or 
modification of existing equipment), training (inform/suggest the carer/patient on new procedures to 
follow), procedures (provision of new or redesign of old procedures) and organisational (changes in 
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organisational policies or culture). The majority of these solutions were classified within the broad 
category of ‘training’, highlighting the importance of enhancing instructions on specific topics such 
as medication identification and storage, followed by ‘the introduction of new or redesigned 
procedures’. For example, the failure ‘The medication in short supply is not ordered’ may be caused 
by the fact that the carers are too busy. To address this, one of the proposed solutions was the 
introduction of new procedures by using a plan to order medications. This solution was classified as 
a ‘training’ remedy because it means that the carers are trained to improve their organisational or IT 
skills (e.g. using spreadsheets, medication administration record charts) (Parand et al., in press). The 
HFMEA team members will be the first to disseminate these findings to community carer groups 
across UK cities and London boroughs.   
Finally, the recommendations, along with the supervisors and the outcome measures, were included 
into a new STAMP control loop (Figure 5). Specifically, the new STAMP control loop was 
enriched with an additional human controller (i.e. the community nurses that provide technical 
assistance to the informal carers); new sensors (i.e. Medication Administration Record - MAR), a 
useful tool that helps the controllers to assess the correctness of medicines taken at different times, 
and My Medication Passport - a customised pocket-sized booklet, designed to record details of 
patients medication with the functionality to keep track of their past and current medicines use 
(Barber et al., 2014).  
 
 
Figure 5 – STAMP: Control Structure upgraded with suggested solutions and outcome measures.[GPs = general 
practitioners; MA = Medication Administration] 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
16 
 
Evaluation Survey 
At the end of the analysis, an evaluation survey was conducted with the aim of identifying the 
advantages and disadvantages of the prospective analysis. The evaluation survey did not aim to 
demonstrate the superiority of the combined approach, although it represents a collection of team 
members’ opinions and feedbacks about the methodology. 
The most common advantages reported by the team were that it is a comprehensive, structured and 
systematic assessment tool to identify failures and their causes that allows different perspectives to 
shed light on processes. The primary disadvantages were that the procedure was hard work and is 
still subjective.  
DISCUSSION 
This study proposes an extended version of the traditional HFMEA.  
HFMEA is a widely recommended method that has previously been applied to analyse numerous 
healthcare processes. The methodology has several advantages; one of the most pertinent is the 
multidisciplinary nature of the team that leads the participants to gain insights into daily practices 
and improve their team working, including their shared understanding of the issues at hand. The 
HFMEA criticisms (reported in Table 1) were addressed in this study by implementing solutions 
proposed in literature and by using SHERPA and STAMP-STPA to provide complementary 
perspectives and findings.  
Before starting the analysis, the topic of the analysis was described with scenarios and grounding 
rules (Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2009). The preparation in advance of documents (i.e., process 
diagram, list of failures) should reduce the duration of the analysis (Vlayen, 2011), (Shebl, Franklin, 
& Barber, 2012), (Habraken et al., 2009). In addition, the elaboration of documents (i.e. i.e. process 
map, list of failure modes) prepared according to scientific findings may help to reduce the 
subjectivity of the HFMEA methodology (Wetterneck et al., 2004). The use of sub-teams resulted 
in a consensus of findings by means of a process of iterative review and refinement, which should 
have increased the validity of the results (Chadwick & Fallon, 2013). 
Specifically, the hybrid method depicts the process with multiple diagrams, improving the clarity of 
the process for those involved (Franklin et al., 2012; Wetterneck et al., 2004). In particular, the box-
and-arrow diagram describes the process as a flowchart and the SHERPA’s HTA diagram offers a 
clear view of the specific tasks. The hazard analysis is enhanced with the classification of the 
failures into human errors (Franklin et al., 2012; Chadwick & Fallon, 2013). In addition, the hazard 
analysis was supported by the use of probability and severity scales with customised descriptors that 
helped the team members to assign ratings without personal interpretations, increasing the 
reliability of the results and preventing lengthy discussions about the exact meaning of probability 
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and severity categories (Wetterneck et al., 2004; Vlayen, 2011; Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2012; 
Habraken et al., 2009; Chadwick & Fallon, 2013; Habraken et al., 2009. Huang et al., 2017). The 
procedure of scoring was based on individual ratings followed by a consensus procedure, shown to 
be one of the best scoring procedures (Ashley et al., 2010 a). The decision tree was also simplified. 
SHERPA helped to highlight the errors that may result from the incorrect order of the tasks and 
provided a taxonomy for the classification of failures into human errors. SHERPA’s consequence 
analysis verified the consistency of severity scorings with the identification of HFMEA’s 
discrepancies and contributed an explicit description of the effects/consequences of the failures, 
details that are not explicitly provided by the traditional HFMEA procedure. The taxonomies used 
by SHERPA provided an explicit guidance on which classification approaches could be used to 
enhance the description of HFMEA’s results. The identification of the process’ recovery points 
augmented the understanding of the process’ activities and their single points of weaknesses.  
STAMP-STPA provided an overview of the process’ controls, improving the cause analysis 
(Antoine, 2013). In contrast to the traditional hazard analysis techniques, however, STAMP-STPA 
is more powerful in terms of identifying more causal factors and hazardous scenarios, particularly 
those related to software, system design, and human behavior (Mahajan et al., 2017, Saleh et al., 
2010). The safety control structure provides excellent documentation and a nice graphical depiction 
of the functional design of the system (Leveson et al. 2013). Finally, the team identified remedies 
starting from the solutions already in place to prevent failures (Chadwick & Fallon, 2013). 
Table 4 specifies the adopted solution from literature and indicates with a cross (‘x’) which tool, 
(SHERPA and/or STAMP-STPA), addresses the HFMEA methodological criticisms previously 
described in Table 1.  
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HFMEA criticisms Solutions from literature SHERPA STAMP 
Graphical description of the process 
The graphical representation of the process 
is too subjective  Prepare documents according to 
scientific findings. 
 
  
The HFMEA box-and-arrow diagrams 
provide only minimum information Improve the process representation 
using other diagram types 
 
x x 
The HFMEA box-and-arrow diagrams 
does not include a description of the 
control measures 
Use diagrams to describe the control 
measures 
 
 x 
Hazard Analysis 
The definition of the potential failures is 
too subjective and there is a poor 
consultation of existing evidence 
 
Prepare documents according to 
scientific findings. 
 
  
HFMEA does not require the description of 
the control measures of the analysed 
process 
Perform a cause analysis with a system 
approach that takes into account the 
complexity of processes 
 
 
x 
HFMEA lacks analysis of human errors Include human error taxonomy to 
identify human errors  
 
x 
 
The rating procedure could be affected by 
personal interpretations of probability 
and severity scales 
 
Adapt the rating scales to the analysed 
process and use an individual 
confirmatory procedure 
  
HFMEA does not require the identification 
of recovery points in the process 
 
Extend the hazard analysis with the 
identification of recovery activities 
x  
The decision tree results can be difficult to 
understand and use 
Simplify and explain the decision tree   
Cause Analysis 
HFMEA does not consider the use of a 
system approach to analyse the causes 
and identify countermeasures 
Perform a cause analysis with a system 
approach that takes into account the 
complexity of processes 
x x 
Identification of recommendations 
HFMEA does not support the continuous 
improvement. 
Define solutions as an improvement 
those already in use 
  
Table 4 - HFMEA criticisms addressed by solutions from literature, and joint SHERPA and STAMP-STPA 
application. The ‘x’ indicates which tool addresses the criticism.  
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Implications for theory and practice  
The hybrid methodology shares the general structure of the proactive hazard analysis approaches: 
an experienced, multi-disciplinary analysis team is assembled, the process is mapped, the process is 
systematically examined by the team to identify potential risks and, lastly, documentation about the 
system is produced. This structure is built on a combination of three different methodologies and 
each combination brings methodological advantages. The integration of SHERPA and HFMEA 
offers a deep understanding of the process with a prominent human component; a FMEA and 
SHERPA combination was successfully applied to study the process of drug administration (Lane, 
Stanton, & Harrison, 2006). Methodologically, the approach taken balances the person-focused 
(HTA and SHERPA) with technology-focused (HFMEA) and system-focused (STAMP-STPA) 
approaches and is therefore more holistic in nature than either of the individual approaches alone 
(Parand et al, just-accepted). 
Furthermore, the combination with STAMP-STPA has the advantage to augment the causal analysis 
with more hazardous scenarios. STAMP-STPA control loop integrates the view of the process with 
a major focused on the control measures necessary to guarantee the safety of patients and the people 
that are in charge for it. FMEA and FMEA combination has given very good results in the domain 
of interoperability of medical devices (Procter et al., 2014). 
Finally, the combination of SHERPA and STAMP brings together two methodologies traditionally 
thought of as rather separate, opening up a number of theoretical advances in ergonomics. SHERPA 
and STAMP-STPA may appear, at first glance, to be at opposite ends of the methodological 
spectrum; SHERPA is a classical, reductionist, task-based, error prediction approach (Di Pasquale 
et al., 2015), whereas STAMP-STPA is a non-reductionist, systems-based, approach (Bjerga et al., 
2016).  Nevertheless, at the core of both methods there is the error taxonomy (SHERPA has 24 
error types and STAMP-STPA has 4 error types).  On the face of it, SHERPA has more 
sophisticated error taxonomy than STAMP-STPA.  The main difference between the two methods 
is the form of representation that they use: SHERPA starts with a description of the tasks being 
performed whereas STAMP-STPA starts with the definition of the system hazards and a 
hierarchical model of the control system. SHERPA offers a bottom-up approach whereas STAMP-
STPA is top-down. Experts in modern complex socio-technical systems design (such as healthcare 
organisations) have argued for both approaches to be used simultaneously to bring about 
improvements (Clegg, 2000; Walker at al., 2009; Mahajan et al., 2017).  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A main limitation of this study is the impossibility to practically demonstrate, with multiple 
applications, that the proposed approach actually reduces the subjectivity and the time with an 
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improvement of the reliability and the resource consumption. Future efforts will be focused on 
objectively assessing the amount of the additional benefits bought by SHERPA and STAMP-STPA 
as well as evaluating the reliability and the validity (Stanton, 2014).  Although it is worth noting 
that the reliability and validity of SHERPA used independently has already been established (Baber 
and Stanton, 1996; Stanton and Stevenage, 1998, Stanton and Young, 1999, 2003). 
CONCLUSION 
Ensuring the safety of patients has become one of the most important challenges faced by 
healthcare professionals. The objective of the patient safety management is to prevent harm to 
patients, with the detection of the problems before they may occur. Currently most of the research 
and work in healthcare is undertaken using older tools, such as root cause analysis for accident 
investigation and HFMEA for hazard analysis. The use of these tools limits the usefulness of the 
analysis. Recent studies (Habraken et al., 2009) have demonstrated that the use of multiple 
methodologies is a convenient solution to increase the level of safety in complex practices because 
of the detailed level of information obtained with the complementary views of the process (Stanton 
et al, 2009). The present study argues that certain limitations of HFMEA can be overcome with the 
integration of two risk analysis methods already in use within healthcare and other settings. This 
combination extends HFMEA and maximise the benefits offered by risk analysis techniques not 
typically applied jointly – SHERPA and STAMP-STPA. HFMEA is a widely used method 
designed to analyse healthcare processes and the main structural steps of the hybrid approach were 
actually identified in the present study using HFMEA. Our study demonstrates that the combination 
of different methods could be worthwhile for the analysis of complex healthcare processes and is 
helpful in addressing some common critiques of HFMEA. The prospective application of the 
combined approach within the context of medication administration errors within domiciliary 
settings produced a rich set of accident causal factors with new solutions to prevent future accidents 
in medication administration process (Parand et al., in press).  
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Appendix A - New worksheet of the combined approach. 
Task & 
Subtask 
 
SHERPA Error mode 
Classification 
HFMEA 
Failure Mode  
SHERPA Consequence and Critical 
Analysis 
SHERPA 
Recovery 
points 
HFMEA Hazard Analysis 
     
Severity Frequency 
Hazard 
Score 
 
Appendix B  - Adapted STAMP taxonomy for the causes’ classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTROL 
1. Inadequate control measures (alarms, checks and double checks, supporting materials, utensils, training): 
 
1.1 Missing control measures to identify/detect failures (e.g. missing alarm). 
1.2 Inappropriate, ineffective, control measures to prevent failures. 
1.3 Missing control measures to prevent failures. 
 
USE OF CONTROLS  
2. Inadequate use of control measure (lack of checks, misuse of supporting materials, misuse of utensils, absence of 
training, ineffective training): 
 
2.1 Inadequate reading/listening/understanding the information provided by control measures. 
2.2 Inadequate action of carer. 
2.3 Inadequate usage time (e.g. too late or too early). 
 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION TO MONITOR THE PROCESS 
3. Inadequate or missing information about the process provided by oversight, reports, measures of indicators: 
 
3.1 Missing systems to monitor the process. 
3.2 Inadequate arrival time of information. 
3.3 Inadequate action of carers or HCPs in giving information about the process (incorrect or no 
information provided). 
